Providing a framework to assess the competitive location of bank branches using game theory by unknown
 Providing a framework to assess the competitive location of bank branches using game 
theory 





Providing a framework to assess the competitive location of bank branches using game 
theory 
Mehdi Badrian1, Mohammad Ehsanifar2 
1 Department of Industrial Engineering, Islamic Azad University, Arak, Iran, 
badrianmehdi@yahoo.com 
2 Department of Industrial Engineering, Islamic Azad University, Arak, Iran, 
drehsanifar1980@gmail.com 
Abstract 
In recent years, growth of financial and credit institutions such as banks, the competition 
among them and customer satisfaction has made it essential to use modern scientific methods 
to choose the optimum location for them. Making optimum decision in choosing the location 
of the financial institution reduces costs, increases efficiency and competitiveness with other 
companies. In some real-world problems, the decision to locate the facility is made by 
independent decision-makers that in addition to maximizing the benefits, compete to maintain 
or increase their market share. Therefore, a new branch in location has addressed the impact 
of competitive conditions in determining the optimal location of facilities. 
The present study aims to select the location of bank branches according to the 
existing competitors in the market and organizations that are likely to enter the 
market based on game theory and cooperative game approach. For this purpose, a 
model of game theory is offered using which one can determine the location of the 
new facility and obtain an equilibrium based on the concept of Nash equilibrium for 
the entire series. After the structure of cooperative games, value of each player is 
calculated according to the intended strategies for each player and coalitions’ utility. 
Finally, the decision-making process is done and the optimal point to establish bank 
branches are selected.  
Keywords: Bank branches, competitive location, game theory, cooperative game, Nash 
equilibrium, Shapley value 
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Selecting the optimum location of facilities is one of the most important and most strategic 
decisions in various industries that has a significant effect on the performance of organizations 
(Ahmadi et al, 2010). Ability of managers to create a comprehensive compilation of all aspects 
of the location provides favorable conditions for survival and success of the organization in the 
competitive environment of the industry. Creating new facilities requires a detailed study on 
the way of correct establishment of these facilities in different regions of the city, so that the 
first key point is selecting the optimum location according to different and sometimes 
contradictory conditions (Mousavi et al, 2013). Spending exorbitant costs in order to create 
business units and also paying attention to communication and ease of access indicate the 
importance of finding the accurate and suitable location for this group of economic actors so 
that easy and quick access to these firms is provided to most citizens. Bank, as part of the firms 
that are always in contact with people, have a special sensitivity in choosing the right place to 
maximize their market share and increase customer satisfaction through fast access. Also taking 
into account the competitive environment of banks to attract potential customers, optimal 
positioning of banking facilities is particularly important for managers (Alhaffa et al., 2011). 
The optimal policy of location is considered for three and more facilities in a linear market 
along which demand is distributed uniformly. In order to solve this problem, pure Nash and 
Stackelberg equilibrium strategy is used for games with three players in a three-stage form. In 
the first stage, player A chooses the optimal location of its facility based on players and 
strategies B and C and in the second stage, player B chooses its location based on player C. In 
fact, the third stage must be solved to solve the problem and solving the second stage, the first 
stage is solved (Shiode et al., 2013). A location game on a network where facilities are 
undesirable and all agencies try to be far from other facilities as much as possible has been 
developed. The method proposed in this study is such that first agencies announce their location 
and accordingly, choose their location mechanism on the network. Here, the aim is to maximize 
social welfare, for example, minimizing the distance between the agency and facilities. In the 
present study, market space is investigated as a network in different states of path, circle and 
tree (Cheng et al., 2014). The problem of price locating game in a discrete space is also 
presented, where the location of players is first determined and then, the price of their goods is 
determined after being placed in the locations. Profit margin is considered to be constant and 
demand is perfectly inelastic. In order to solve the problem correctly, branch-and-bound 
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algorithm for small, medium and large sizes of heuristics is used (Fernandez et al., 2014). Given 
the diversity of competitive location problems with game theory approach in terms of types, 
structure and limits of problems and type of the objective functions, a variety of solutions have 
been proposed that are divided into two general categories of non-cooperative and cooperative. 
In most cases, the primary concepts of Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg model, Voronoi, 
coalition, and developmental games, rounded off equilibrium and polynomial metaheuristic 
algorithm are used in non-cooperative mode and Shapley, Johnston, Deegan – Packel, Shapley 
- Shubik and Banzhaf methods are used to solve problems in cooperative mode. However, due 
to the complexity of the structure of the model and solving methods of competitive location 
problem with cooperative game approach, number of research in this area is far less than the 
non-cooperative mode. Therefore, cooperative game approach using Shapley method in the 
field of strategic variables is used to solve competitive location problem of this study. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Basic concepts in locating 
2.1.1 Facilities, location and customer are three main components describing a location 
allocation problem. Each of these components can be used to identify a problem and may also 
play different roles in different location problems (Miliotis et al., 2002). 
One of the features of facilities in many location allocation models is the number of new 
equipment required to be placed in a specific region. Accordingly, the two general categories 
of single facilities and multi-facilities problems are considered. In contrast, the number of 
facilities required for the placement may not be known in advance. In such cases, the goal is to 
find the minimum number of facilities to cover all demand points in accordance with a certain 
distance standard (Miliotis et al., 2002). Another important feature of facilities is their type that 
includes capacity and services of facilities. If facilities are able to provide unlimited demands, 
they are called capacitated and if the capacity of facilities is limited, an incapacitated model 
will be faced. Cost is another feature of facilities, according to which the location allocation 
models can be separated. Facilities’ cost is divided into two fixed and variable types. The fixed 
one is dependent on expenses and the variable one associated with service provision (Miliotis 
et al., 2002). 
2.1.2 Demand is the second essential component of location allocation algorithm that is also 
known as customer. Customer or demand is a person who needs to get access to a service or 
supply of a product. Considering the distribution of requirements in space, three different modes 
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will emerge. Accordingly, requirements can be uniform in the region or on the network, can 
belong to a certain point (which is geographically coded) throughout the region, or can be 
assigned to the mass center of the region. However, when the actual data is not available, 
requirements can be determined randomly in order to simulate the problem. Customers’ 
requirements can be categorized as deterministic or stochastic. If the number of customers, 
locations and requirements are all clear, the model is called deterministic and if the customer 
requirements are modeled using probability models, the model is called stochastic one (Miliotis 
et al., 2002). 
2.1.3 The third essential component of location problems is space or location. There are three 
different displays of space in location problems that include discrete, continuous, and network-
based display. In the discrete space model, it is assumed that there is a prior knowledge about 
candidate or potential locations. Hence some of the best locations will be selected from among 
the potential locations. Some location-allocation problems deal with continuous spaces that 
determine one or more coordinates with continuous changes of all potential locations. These 
continuous places are always considered as normal in Euclidean space (Karaganis et al., 2011). 
2.2 Competitive facility location and its classification 
One branch of location theory in relation to location positioning is competitive facilities. In 
competitive facility location models, the decision to locate the facility is made by independent 
decision-makers that in addition to maximizing the benefits, compete to maintain or increase 
their market share. Because of this competitive nature, these problems are known as competitive 
facility location problems (Saidani et al., 2012). Competitive facility location problems aim to 
find the optimal location for new facilities that must compete with existing facilities or facilities 
that will enter the market in the future in order to capture market share. Studies show that the 
input type is the basic feature to model these problems. After recognizing the problem and 
determining the model in terms of its input type, other parameters can be entered in the 
constraints or objective function (Ashtiani, 2016). 
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Figure 1: Classifying competitive location problems based on model’s features (Ashtiani, 
2016) 
3. Game theory 
Game theory, as a new branch of mathematics with a new approach to decision making 
problems, has grabbed the attention of many engineering investigators, especially industrial and 
civil engineering, in recent years. As the word game suggests, the problems that game theory 
can be applied for have several beneficiary decision makers. Game theory is a science that 
studies people's decisions in interactions with others. In other words, game theory is the study 
of conflicts and cooperation between rational actors. The main goal of game theory is providing 
an outlook according to which actors should behave rationally. Generally, game theory is 
divided into two branches of non-cooperative games and cooperative games. Non-cooperative 
games are those that players act independently and each player seeks to maximize his own 
benefits. Looking for more benefits makes them choose the Nash equilibrium that, like strategic 
equilibrium, is detriment of the players in most cases. In cooperative games, players may agree 
to choose some strategies in order to enjoy more benefits. The agreement may be between all 
the players or some of them, which is called coalition. The agreement must be motivated and 
without the use of force. In this case, players tend to cooperate when the result of cooperation 
is at least the same as acting independently so that the motivation to cooperate and join coalition 
is created in players. The first step in the cooperative game theory is searching for possible 
agreements or coalitions of a game and their results. The second step is dividing coalition 
consequences among members so that the motivation to join coalition is created. A cooperative 
game with n players in the form of a characteristic function is an ordered pair of G(N,v), where 
N is a finite set with n members, i.e. N = {1,2, ..., n}, and indeed N is the number of players. 
The subset (S, S ⊆ N) is called coalition. A coalition is easily formed when it includes the null 
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set and the N itself. Also, v is a real value that shows two utility values of coalition’s players 
and their recipient. The two main questions in cooperative game models are as follows: 
1. What coalitions are formed? 
2. If the whole coalition is formed, how do players share profit or cost? 
In general, ideas such as the Shapley value, nucleolus, marginal share, Johnston index, Deegan-
Packel index, and Shapley-Shubik index are proposed to share the benefits of cooperation. Each 
of these ideas has proposed a fair division of profits from cooperation on the basis of their 
assumptions (Abdoli, 2014). 
3.1 Shapley value 
For an N-person game with cooperation, Shapley has calculated the mean recipient of each 
player from coalition. This means that the amount received, 𝒖𝒊
∗, by player i is determined using 
this concept. 
If player i joins a coalition C, his marginal productivity in the coalition is defined as equation 
1: 
{𝑽(𝑪) − 𝑽(𝑪 − (𝒊))}                               (1) 
Assuming that coalition is generally formed from the coalition of one to two people ... and to 
N people and any sort of joining the coalition is possible, then 𝒖𝒊
∗ of player i shows the average 
marginal productivity in the game, which is defined by equation (2): 
𝒖𝒊
∗ =  ∑
(𝒌−𝟏)!(𝑵−𝒌)!
𝑵!
{𝑽(𝑪) − 𝑽(𝑪 − (𝒊))} 
{𝑪⊂𝑵
𝒊∈𝑪
                                                         (2) 
Where: 
N: is total number of players 
C: K is total number of players in coalition 
(𝒌−𝟏)!(𝑵−𝒌)!
𝑵!
 : is the possibility of the occurrence of each coalition 
Equation (2) is obtained from all calculations per possible coalition of participant i. 
Eq. (2) meets the following three principles: 
A. Symmetry 
If permutations of decision-makers i and j for a characteristic function of a decision-making 
process are equal to each other, then their payment efficiency after group decision-making must 
be the same. That means that for every permutation of r and N, equation (3) is established: 
{
𝑽(𝒓(𝑪)) = 𝑽(𝑪)  ;   ∀𝑪 𝝐𝑻
⟶  𝒖𝒓(𝒊)
∗ =  𝒖𝒊
∗                                           (3) 
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Effectiveness is shown in equation (4). 
∑ 𝒖𝒊
∗ = 𝑽(𝑵)𝒊∈𝑵                 (4) 
C. Assembly Law 
Two desired and characteristic functions of v and w are considered, then equation (5) is as 
follows. 
𝒖𝒊
∗(𝒗 + 𝒘) = 𝒖𝒊
∗(𝒗) +  𝒖𝒊
∗(𝒘)                                                                                                             
(5) 
Received value of player i in two separate games (v,w) is equal to his received value in a 
compound game that is consisted of those two separate games. 
Based on the principles A to C, Shapley theorem is presented as follows. 
Shapley theorem 
Vector 𝒖𝒊
∗ exists and is essentially unique when it meets the above mentioned principles and its 
elements are obtained from Eq. (2). Shapley value 𝒖𝒊
∗ can characterize the power of player i in 
his sensitivity and effectiveness to win a coalition. The power will depend on the increase of 
productivity of a coalition after the player i has joined the coalition (Guillermo, 2015). 
4. Research methodology 
The present study is followed by the development of applied knowledge in a particular area. It 
is intended to use the findings to solve competitive location problems of bank branches and 
tries to answer a practical problem existing in the real world. Therefore, it is applied in terms 
of its objectives and is descriptive-survey in terms of research methodology. Research 
population also include all managers, experts and scholars in the field of banking at Sina Bank, 
who had the following features: 
1) Having an experience of at least ten years in the banking industry 
2) Having an organizational position of at least branch management and higher 
The exact number of population of the study is unknown. To collect the required data, expert 
interviews and questionnaires have been used. 
Step One: Determining the required number of branches in the region 
Based on the existing standards, the number of required bank branches in the region is 
determined. It should be noted that based on the current situation, the number of bank branches 
per 100 thousand population is 27 bank branches, which is of course much higher than 
international standards. 
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Figure 2: graph of the number of bank branches per 100 thousand population (Source: 
http://www.mckinsey.com/) 
According to the above mentioned population and standard, the number of required branches is 
calculated. Therefore, output of this stage is shared with the sample and the raw number is 
summed up or reduced from the specified number of required branches in the region. 
Step Two: Identifying the important criteria of selecting competitive location of banks 
A list of important criteria in the choice of competitive location of facilities, specifically banks, 
is prepared and then, a number of the most important ones in the banking industry and financial 
sector are also chosen through interviews with the sample. 
Step Three: Identifying candidate points 
For each of the criteria identified in the second step, points candidate to create a new branch 
are proposed based on the number of required branches obtained in the first step. 
Step Four: Creating the structure of cooperative game 
Game theory is used to choose the best points based on identified competitive criteria. The 
game proposed in this section is such that each competitive criteria identified in the second step 
is considered as a player, which means we will have a number of players the same as the number 
of competitive criteria. In this game, each player (competitive criteria) will have game strategies 
to the number of candidate points in that criteria. For example, if 5 points are candidate in each 
criteria, each player has 5 game strategies. The purpose of this cooperative game (between 
competitive criteria) is to choose the best strategy (best candidate points) such that the marginal 
utility is maximized. Therefore, the structure of cooperative game is created up to this step. 
Step Five: Calculating the utility of single coalition 
In this step, the expert panel is asked to consider all candidate points in each criteria and give a 
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criteria (players) and 5 candidate points (game strategies) for each criterion, there will be a total 
of 20 candidate points and the expert panel gives a score of 0 to 5 to 20 candidate points for 
each criterion. For example, the candidate point 10 gets a utility score of 2 in criterion 3. 
Step Six: Calculating the utility of dual coalition 
In this step, all dual coalitions that can be formed among players are created and utility of these 
coalitions is taken into account. For example, if player 1 (competitive criteria 1) and player 2 
(competitive criteria 2) form a coalition, they will have a utility. In order to calculate the utility 
of coalitions, sum of the utility of coalition members is used. 
𝑼𝑭,𝑪 = 𝑼𝑭(𝑪) + 𝑼𝑪(𝑪) = 𝟒 + 𝟐 = 𝟔                                                                                          (6) 
Step Seven: Calculating the utility of triple and multiple coalition 
In this step, as step six, all triple coalitions are formed and utility of each coalition is obtained. 
All formable coalitions such as foursome and quintet coalitions are formed in this step and their 
utility is calculate like the previous step. Therefore, at the end of this step, utility of single, 
double, triple and ... coalitions is obtained. 
Step Eight: Writing calculated utilities as normal tables 
In this step, the results of coalitions’ utility calculation done in steps five to seven are written 
in the form of normal tables common in game theory (2-dimentional tables) so that Nash 
equilibrium for each coalition can be extracted from these tables.  
Step Nine: Calculating the value of characteristic function 𝑽(𝑪) for each coalition 
According to von Neumann and Morgenstern, the value of a characteristic function 𝑽(𝑪) of a 
coalition in the normal form (two-dimensional) has features of a saddle point. As it is known, 
min-max of a row and min-max of a column coincide in a saddle point, this is because the allies 
in the row try to maximize their minimum utility and non-allies in the column try to minimize 
the maximum loss. Although non-allies may nevertheless have positive returns, but less return 
for allies could result in more return for them. 
In general, the characteristics of a saddle point for a game in the normal form (2-dimentional) 
can be obtained by solving L-P linear programming (for each ally in the row). 
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Figure 3: a saddle point (Source: 
Barron, E.N., (2013). Game 
theory: an Introduction. (2nd 
ed). Newjersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc) 
The 𝑽(𝑪) defined for a two-dimensional and non-zero game (consisting of N players) observes 
𝑽(𝝓) = 𝟎 feature and covers more than additive. Therefore, if Cij represents the utility of 
coalition of row i and column j of the coalition matrix (Coalition C) and Pi determines the choice 
probability (of combination of the strategies contained in the i-th row) for allies, so that the i-
th row represents a combination of coalition’s strategies and j-th column represents a 
combination of non-allies’ strategies, then 𝑽(𝑪) is obtained by solving (L-P) linear 
programming in equation (7): 
𝑽(𝑪) = 𝒎𝒂𝒙: 𝒛 
𝒔𝒕: 
𝒛 ≤ ∑ 𝑷𝒊𝒊 ∗ 𝑪𝒊 ⟶ ∀𝒋                                                                                                                (7) 
𝑷𝒊 ≥ 𝟎 
𝒛: 𝒇𝒓𝒆𝒆                             
Now to get the characteristic function of different coalitions of players (competitive criteria), 
Linear Programming (7) is written based on its coalition matrix and the 𝑽(𝑪) value of any 
coalition is obtained by solving the model using Lingo software. 
Step Ten: Calculating the Shapley value for each player 
For an N-person cooperative game, the Shapley value of mean recipient of each player from 
coalition is calculated. This means that the 𝒖𝒊
∗ amount received by player i is determined with 
this concept. 
If player i joins coalition C, his marginal productivity in the coalition is defined as equation (8): 
{𝑽(𝑪) − 𝑽(𝑪 − (𝒊))}                (8) 
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Assuming that coalition is generally formed from the coalition of one to two people ... and to 
N people and any sort of joining the coalition is possible, then 𝒖𝒊
∗ of player i shows the average 
marginal productivity in the game, which is defined by equation (9): 
𝒖𝒊
∗ =  ∑
(𝒌−𝟏)!(𝑵−𝒌)!
𝑵!
{𝑽(𝑪) − 𝑽(𝑪 − (𝒊))} 
{𝑪⊂𝑵
𝒊∈𝑪
                               (9) 
Where: 
N: is total number of players 
C: K is total number of players in coalition 
(𝒌−𝟏)!(𝑵−𝒌)!
𝑵!
: is the possibility of the occurrence of each coalition 
Equation (9) is obtained from all calculations per possible coalition of participant i. 
Shapley value 𝒖𝒊
∗ can characterize the power of player i in his sensitivity and effectiveness to 
win a coalition. The power will depend on the increase of productivity of a coalition after the 
player i has joined the coalition. 
Using the value of characteristic function of 𝑽(𝑪) calculated in step nine and the above 
explanation, Shapley value is calculated for each player (competitive criterion). 
Step Eleven: choosing the optimal points of the candidate points 
According to Shapley value obtained for players (competitive criteria), the order of power and 
their sensitivity in coalitions is determined. 
5. Case study 
To implement the framework provided in the study, region 6 of Tehran, Iran, is taken into 
account. It has a population of 269,034 people and an area of 2144 hectares that is limited to 
Hemmat highway in the north, Enqelab-Azadi axis in the south, Modarres Highway in the East, 
and Chamran Highway in the west. The area under the current circumstances and in accordance 
with approved official borders and boundaries is separated into seven districts and nineteen 
neighborhoods and is one of the most populated and most commercial areas of Tehran. Figure 
5 shows the spatial location of this region. 
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Figure 4: the spatial location of the sixth region of Tehran 
Step One: Determining the required number of branches in the region 
In the first step, the number of required bank branches in the region is determined. Table 1 
shows the number of bank branches existing in this region. 
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The following steps are taken to determine the required number of branches: 
Step 1: In this stage, based on the existing standards, the number of required bank branches in 
the region is determined. It should be noted that based on the current situation, the number of 
bank branches per 100 thousand population is 27 bank branches, which is of course much higher 
than international standards. 
Due to the region's population that is 269000 people, the number of bank branches that must be 
placed in region 6 is equal to 73 bank branches. However, according to data in table (1), there 
are about 387 bank branches in this region, this means that there are 144 bank branches per 
100,000 population. However, this is not unexpected because of the usage of region 6. The 
output of this step is a raw number of required number of branches in the region. 
The results of step 1 shows that there is no need to create a new branch of Sina bank in region 
6. 
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Step 2: The raw number calculated in previous step is shared with the sample and given the 
current situation such as the expected need for  
Sina bank in the region, managers’ idea regarding the establishment of new branch and all 
points mentioned by the experts must be taken into account and then the raw number is summed 
up or reduced and the specified number of required branches in the region is obtained. 
The expert panel of the study noted that there is definitely a need to develop bank branches in 
region 6 and argued that region 6, in fact, covers a large part of Tehran and it is even an 
important part of the country and the need to consider the development of branches is essential; 
as rival banks also have a strong focus on this region and statistics in Table 1 also shows. The 
expert panel believes that the excessive expansion of bank branches in an area is not suitable; 
therefore, they suggest that the development of branches should not be done without the 
necessary backings such as implementation of customer attraction systems. Finally, the 
decision maker team suggests that three new bank branched should be located in region 6 of 
Tehran. 
Step Two: Identifying competitive location criteria 
Table 2: competitive location criteria (Source: Miliotis et al. 2002; Farahani et al. 2010; 
Ashtiani, 2016) 
Row Criteria 
1 Economic interests 
2 Competitive strategy with other banks 
3 Dense coverage 
4 Existing infrastructure 
Step Three: Identifying candidate points 
In this step, for each of the criteria identified in the second step, points candidate to create a 
new branch are proposed based on the number of required branches obtained in the first step. 
Therefore, 3 points for each criterion and a total of 12 points are candidate points. Points that 
are candidate for each criterion are the best locations in terms of the criteria. In other words, 
candidate points in each criterion have sufficient utility in the criteria. This step is also 
conducted with the help of the expert team. Table 3 shows the candidate points in each criterion. 
Table 3: identifying candidate points for each criterion 
Criterion Candidate points Symbol 
Economic interests Valiasr – on the corner of Tarabande F1 
 Providing a framework to assess the competitive location of bank branches using game 
theory 





Iranshenasi Street F2 
Farhang square F3 
Competitive strategy with 
other banks 
Yadmane Sabz C1 
Salmas square C2 
Fatemi street – on the corner of Sanee C3 
Dense coverage 
Vesal Street – on the corner of Felestin I1 
Taleghani and Nejatollahi intersection I2 
Somaye Street I3 
Existing infrastructure 
Gharani – Apadana hospital L1 
Ghaem Magham – Erfan L2 
Alvand – Ahoora Mazda L3 
 
Step Four: Creating the structure of cooperative game 
Game theory is used to choose the best points based on identified competitive criteria. The 
game proposed in this section is such that each competitive criteria identified in the second step 
is considered as a player, which means we will have a number of players the same as the number 
of competitive criteria. In this game, each player (competitive criteria) will have game strategies 
to the number of candidate points in that criteria. The purpose of this cooperative game 
(between competitive criteria) is to choose the best strategy (best candidate points) such that 
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Table 4: structure of the combination of different criteria strategies in a cooperative 
game with three candidate points for each criterion 
 
Step Five: Calculating the utility of single coalition 
Table 5: players’ utility from strategies’ combination 
Fi Ci Ii Li UF UC UI UL 
1 1 1 1 3 5 1 4 
1 1 1 2 2 1 3 5 
1 1 1 3 0 4 3 4 
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1 1 2 1 4 3 0 1 
1 1 2 2 4 2 1 1 
1 1 2 3 0 4 1 0 
1 1 3 1 3 2 1 2 
1 1 3 2 2 1 1 4 
1 1 3 3 2 3 0 3 
1 2 1 1 4 4 2 0 
1 2 1 2 3 3 3 1 
1 2 1 3 2 4 3 3 
1 2 2 1 1 2 4 4 
1 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 
1 2 2 3 3 3 0 1 
1 2 3 1 0 3 5 4 
1 2 3 2 5 1 0 3 
1 2 3 3 3 3 3 0 
1 3 1 1 3 3 0 3 
1 3 1 2 0 4 2 5 
1 3 1 3 2 1 5 2 
1 3 2 1 4 1 3 2 
1 3 2 2 1 4 2 4 
1 3 2 3 5 5 5 3 
1 3 3 1 2 0 3 1 
1 3 3 2 1 4 5 3 
1 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 
2 1 1 1 1 4 1 2 
2 1 1 2 1 2 3 3 
2 1 1 3 3 1 4 2 
2 1 2 1 1 4 5 3 
2 1 2 2 2 3 1 4 
2 1 2 3 5 0 2 1 
2 1 3 1 1 1 1 0 
2 1 3 2 4 4 5 1 
 Providing a framework to assess the competitive location of bank branches using game 
theory 





2 1 3 3 1 1 5 2 
2 2 1 1 4 1 1 4 
2 2 1 2 5 2 1 4 
2 2 1 3 1 4 1 4 
2 2 2 1 1 2 1 0 
2 2 2 2 4 2 3 5 
2 2 2 3 3 2 0 3 
2 2 3 1 2 3 4 0 
2 2 3 2 5 5 2 3 
2 2 3 3 4 3 4 3 
2 3 1 1 2 4 5 3 
2 3 1 2 2 4 3 1 
2 3 1 3 2 4 1 4 
2 3 2 1 1 3 5 3 
2 3 2 2 2 1 3 2 
2 3 2 3 4 5 5 4 
2 3 3 1 2 3 4 5 
2 3 3 2 3 5 1 0 
2 3 3 3 1 4 3 2 
3 1 1 1 5 4 2 4 
3 1 1 2 1 4 5 2 
3 1 1 3 3 5 2 0 
        
3 1 2 1 1 3 3 5 
3 1 2 2 4 2 5 3 
3 1 2 3 2 3 1 3 
3 1 3 1 3 1 5 5 
3 1 3 2 3 4 2 4 
3 1 3 3 3 2 4 4 
3 2 1 1 4 2 4 1 
3 2 1 2 3 3 4 1 
3 2 1 3 3 5 2 1 
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3 2 2 1 2 2 3 4 
3 2 2 2 3 1 3 2 
3 2 2 3 3 4 5 3 
3 2 3 1 2 3 2 2 
3 2 3 2 3 5 3 4 
3 2 3 3 5 3 4 4 
3 3 1 1 3 1 4 2 
3 3 1 2 3 4 2 5 
3 3 1 3 1 1 5 4 
3 3 2 1 4 5 2 2 
3 3 2 2 0 3 1 1 
3 3 2 3 3 5 3 4 
3 3 3 1 5 3 5 2 
3 3 3 2 4 5 3 1 
3 3 3 3 1 5 3 1 
 
Step Six and Seven: Calculating the utility of dual, triple and multiple coalition 






























1 1 1 1 8 4 7 6 9 5 9 12 10 8 13 
1 1 1 2 3 5 7 4 6 8 6 8 9 10 11 
1 1 1 3 4 3 4 7 8 7 7 8 11 7 11 
1 1 2 1 7 4 5 3 4 1 7 8 4 5 8 
1 1 2 2 6 5 5 3 3 2 7 7 4 6 8 
1 1 2 3 4 1 0 5 4 1 5 4 5 1 5 
1 1 3 1 5 4 5 3 4 3 6 7 5 6 8 
1 1 3 2 3 3 6 2 5 5 4 7 6 7 8 
1 1 3 3 5 2 5 3 6 3 5 8 6 5 8 
1 2 1 1 8 6 4 6 4 2 10 8 6 6 10 
1 2 1 2 6 6 4 6 4 4 9 7 7 7 10 
1 2 1 3 6 5 5 7 7 6 9 9 10 8 12 
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1 2 2 1 3 5 5 6 6 8 7 7 10 9 11 
1 2 2 2 2 3 2 1 0 1 3 2 1 3 3 
1 2 2 3 6 3 4 3 4 1 6 7 4 4 7 
1 2 3 1 3 5 4 8 7 9 8 7 12 9 12 
1 2 3 2 6 5 8 1 4 3 6 9 4 8 9 
1 2 3 3 6 6 3 6 3 3 9 6 6 6 9 
1 3 1 1 6 3 6 3 6 3 6 9 6 6 9 
1 3 1 2 4 2 5 6 9 7 6 9 11 7 11 
1 3 1 3 3 7 4 6 3 7 8 5 8 9 10 
1 3 2 1 5 7 6 4 3 5 8 7 6 9 10 
1 3 2 2 5 3 5 6 8 6 7 9 10 7 11 
1 3 2 3 10 10 8 10 8 8 15 13 13 13 18 
1 3 3 1 2 5 3 3 1 4 5 3 4 6 6 
1 3 3 2 5 6 4 9 7 8 10 8 12 9 13 
1 3 3 3 5 5 4 4 3 3 7 6 5 6 8 
2 1 1 1 5 2 3 5 6 3 6 7 7 4 8 
2 1 1 2 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 6 8 7 9 
2 1 1 3 4 7 5 5 3 6 8 6 7 9 10 
2 1 2 1 5 6 4 9 7 8 10 8 12 9 13 
2 1 2 2 5 3 6 4 7 5 6 9 8 7 10 
2 1 2 3 5 7 6 2 1 3 7 6 3 8 8 
2 1 3 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 3 2 2 2 3 
2 1 3 2 8 9 5 9 5 6 13 9 10 10 14 
2 1 3 3 2 6 3 6 3 7 7 4 8 8 9 
2 2 1 1 5 5 8 2 5 5 6 9 6 9 10 
2 2 1 2 7 6 9 3 6 5 8 11 7 10 12 
2 2 1 3 5 2 5 5 8 5 6 9 9 6 10 
2 2 2 1 3 2 1 3 2 1 4 3 3 2 4 
2 2 2 2 6 7 9 5 7 8 9 11 10 12 14 
2 2 2 3 5 3 6 2 5 3 5 8 5 6 8 
2 2 3 1 5 6 2 7 3 4 9 5 7 6 9 
2 2 3 2 10 7 8 7 8 5 12 13 10 10 15 
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2 2 3 3 7 8 7 7 6 7 11 10 10 11 14 
2 3 1 1 6 7 5 9 7 8 11 9 12 10 14 
2 3 1 2 6 5 3 7 5 4 9 7 8 6 10 
2 3 1 3 6 3 6 5 8 5 7 10 9 7 11 
2 3 2 1 4 6 4 8 6 8 9 7 11 9 12 
2 3 2 2 3 5 4 4 3 5 6 5 6 7 8 
2 3 2 3 9 9 9 10 10 10 14 14 15 14 19 
2 3 3 1 5 6 7 7 8 9 9 10 12 11 14 
2 3 3 2 8 4 3 6 5 1 9 8 6 4 9 
2 3 3 3 5 4 3 7 6 5 8 7 9 6 10 
3 1 1 1 9 7 9 6 8 6 11 13 10 11 15 
3 1 1 2 5 6 3 9 6 7 10 7 11 8 12 
3 1 1 3 8 5 3 7 5 2 10 8 7 5 10 
3 1 2 1 4 4 6 6 8 8 7 9 11 9 12 
3 1 2 2 6 9 7 7 5 8 11 9 10 12 14 
3 1 2 3 5 3 5 4 6 4 6 8 7 6 9 
3 1 3 1 4 8 8 6 6 10 9 9 11 13 14 
3 1 3 2 7 5 7 6 8 6 9 11 10 9 13 
3 1 3 3 5 7 7 6 6 8 9 9 10 11 13 
3 2 1 1 6 8 5 6 3 5 10 7 7 9 11 
3 2 1 2 6 7 4 7 4 5 10 7 8 8 11 
3 2 1 3 8 5 4 7 6 3 10 9 8 6 11 
3 2 2 1 4 5 6 5 6 7 7 8 9 9 11 
3 2 2 2 4 6 5 4 3 5 7 6 6 8 9 
3 2 2 3 7 8 6 9 7 8 12 10 12 11 15 
3 2 3 1 5 4 4 5 5 4 7 7 7 6 9 
3 2 3 2 8 6 7 8 9 7 11 12 12 10 15 
3 2 3 3 8 9 9 7 7 8 12 12 11 13 16 
3 3 1 1 4 7 5 5 3 6 8 6 7 9 10 
3 3 1 2 7 5 8 6 9 7 9 12 11 10 14 
3 3 1 3 2 6 5 6 5 9 7 6 10 10 11 
3 3 2 1 9 6 6 7 7 4 11 11 9 8 13 
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3 3 2 2 3 1 1 4 4 2 4 4 5 2 5 
3 3 2 3 8 6 7 8 9 7 11 12 12 10 15 
3 3 3 1 8 10 7 8 5 7 13 10 10 12 15 
3 3 3 2 9 7 5 8 6 4 12 10 9 8 13 
3 3 3 3 6 4 2 8 6 4 9 7 9 5 10 
 
Step Eight: Writing calculated utilities as normal tables 
In this step, the results of coalitions’ utility calculation done in steps five to seven are written 
in the form of normal tables common in game theory (2-dimentional tables) so that Nash 
equilibrium for each coalition can be extracted from these tables. To avoid the presentation of 
multiple tables obtained from coalitions, the normal form of utility of coalitions F and C is 
explained using tables (5) and (6). 
Table 7: normal form of utility of coalition (F, C) 
 Ii 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 
 Li 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Fi Ci          
1 1 8 3 4 7 6 4 5 3 5 
1 2 8 6 6 3 2 6 3 6 6 
1 3 6 4 3 5 5 10 2 5 5 
2 1 5 3 4 5 5 5 2 8 2 
2 2 5 7 5 3 6 5 5 10 7 
2 3 6 6 6 4 3 9 5 8 5 
3 1 9 5 8 4 6 5 4 7 5 
3 2 6 6 8 4 4 7 5 8 8 
3 3 4 7 2 9 3 8 8 9 6 
 
Step Nine: Calculating the value of characteristic function 𝐕(𝐂) for each coalition 
The 𝐕(𝐂) defined for a two-dimensional and non-zero game (consisting of N players) observes 
𝑽(𝝓) = 𝟎 feature and covers more than additive. Then, 𝐕(𝐂) is obtained by solving (L-P) linear 
programming in equation (7). 
 
Table 8: characteristic function of coalition 
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V(F) V(C) V(I) V(L) V(F,C) V(F,I) V(F,L) V(I,L) V(C,L) V(C,I) V(F,C,I) V(F,C,L) V(F,I,L) 
1.25 1.818182 1 0.9 5.310345 5.57143 5.44118 5.251917 5.516854 5.5 10.8636 11.18182 9.62857 
 
Step Ten: Calculating the Shapley value for each player 
Shapley value 𝒖𝒊
∗ can characterize the power of player i in his sensitivity and effectiveness to 
win a coalition. The power will depend on the increase of productivity of a coalition after the 
player i has joined the coalition. Using the value of characteristic function 𝐕(𝐂) calculated in 
the previous step and equations 8 and 9, Shapley value is calculated for each player (competitive 
criterion). 
Table 9: Shapley value of players 
 shapley value  
F 4.3966655  
C 5.377244  
I 4.586124667  
L 4.639965333  
Step Eleven: choosing the optimal points of the candidate points 
According to Shapley value obtained for players (competitive criteria), the order of power and 
their sensitivity in coalitions is determined. It is such that any criterion with high Shapley value 
has the highest impact on the process of utility creation. Accordingly, the process to choose 
optimal points will be as follows: 
According to Shapley value obtained for players, C> L> I> F is the order of power and their 
sensitivity in the coalition. Therefore, in choosing to run a combination of strategies, 
competitive strategy with other banks has a decisive role, then according to the category of 
competitive strategy with other banks, the criterion of existing infrastructure, dense covering 
criterion, and economic interests deal with choosing a strategy to get the best payment, 
respectively. 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
According to 81 different combinations of strategies and amounts received by each player, in 
12 strategy combinations, the amount received by the criterion of competitive strategy with 
other banks is 5. Therefore, the criterion of competitive strategy with other banks will choose 
its strategy from among these 12 strategy combinations. 
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Table (10) shows combinations in which the criterion of competitive strategy with other banks 
had 5 recipients. After the criterion competitive strategy with other banks, the criterion of 
existing infrastructure tries to maximize his recipients. Therefore, the criterion of existing 
infrastructure chooses a combination that gets the highest recipient. The process will continue 
until the last player so that a certain strategy combination is selected. The selection process is 
shown in figure (5). 
If the criterion of competitive strategy with other banks chooses strategy 1 from among the 
combinations with 5 recipient, the criterion of existing infrastructure chooses strategy 1 from 
among the two strategies of 1 and 3 with 4 and 0 recipients, respectively. After the selection of 
the criterion of existing infrastructure, no other choice is left to the next players, i.e. the dense 
coverage and economic interests, and they have to choose strategies 1 and 1 with 1 and 3 
recipients, respectively. Finally, the strategy combination of C1L1I1 is chosen and there is no 
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C L I F C-u l-u i-u F-u 
3 3 2 1 5 3 5 5 
3 3 2 2 5 4 5 4 
3 2 3 2 5 0 1 3 
3 1 2 3 5 2 2 4 
3 3 2 3 5 4 3 3 
3 2 3 3 5 1 3 4 
3 3 3 3 5 1 3 1 
        
2 2 3 2 5 3 2 5 
2 3 1 3 5 1 2 3 
2 2 3 3 5 4 3 3 
        
1 1 1 1 5 4 1 3 
1 3 1 3 5 0 2 3 
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Figure 5: The process of choosing the best location 
If the criterion of competitive strategy with other banks chooses strategy 2, the criterion of 
existing infrastructure chooses the combination of C2L2I3 with 4 recipients, which is the highest 
one. After the selection of the criterion of existing infrastructure, no other choice is left to the 
next players and they accept the selected strategy combination. 
If the criterion of competitive strategy with other banks chooses strategy 3, the criterion of 
existing infrastructure has two choices of C3L3I2 and C3L3I2, in which the highest recipients are 
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among the two existing combinations because of the highest recipient. The process of choosing 
the strategy is shown in figure (5). 
According to this description, Fatemi Street – on the corner of Sanee, Alvand – Ahoora Mazda, 
and Taleghani and Nejatollahi intersection are chosen as optimal points to establish bank 
branches, which were the best points from the viewpoint of experts. 
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